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We study a general quantum key distribution protocol in higher dimension. In this protocol, quantum states in
arbitrary g+1 (1 ≤ g ≤ d) out of all d+ 1 mutually unbiased bases in a d-dimensional system can be used for
the key encoding. This provides a natural generalization of the quantum key distribution in higher dimension
and recovers the previously known results for g = 1 and d. In our investigation, we study Eve’s attack by
two slightly different approaches. One is considering the optimal cloner for Eve, and the other, defined as the
optimal attack, is maximizing Eve’s information. We derive results for both approaches and show the deviation
of the optimal cloner from the optimal attack. With our systematic investigation of the quantum key distribution
protocols in higher dimension, one may balance the security gain and the implementation cost by changing the
number of bases in the key encoding. As a side product, we also prove the equivalency between the optimal
phase covariant quantum cloning machine and the optimal cloner for the g = d− 1 quantum key distribution.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Aa, 03.67.Ac, 03.65.Ta
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a promising applica-
tion of quantum mechanics. The first QKD protocol was pro-
posed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84) [1] and has
been proved to be unconditionally secure [2, 3]. This protocol
was later generalized to the six-state protocol [4]. Meanwhile,
various other protocols were developed, among which, for ex-
ample, was the Ekert 91 protocol [5]. In the past decades,
significant progress has been made both theoretically and ex-
perimentally in establishing point-to-point as well as network
types of key distributions; see, for example, Refs. [6–11].
In a simple two dimensional system, one can either use four
quantum states or six quantum states, which correspond to the
BB84 protocol and the six-state protocol respectively, to en-
code binary symbols. In a higher-dimensional system of di-
mension d [12], there are altogether d + 1 mutually unbiased
bases (MUBs) available for the QKD. The counterparts of the
BB84 protocol and the six-state protocol of a d-dimensional
system are the 2-basis protocol and the (d+1)-basis protocol.
Naturally, one may think of a general (g + 1)-basis protocol
(g = 1, 2, ... , d), where arbitrary g+1 MUBs are utilized to
encode d-ary symbols. In the past few years, there have been
many studies on higher-dimensional QKD protocols. The
QKD using four-level systems were done first [13, 14], and
interests soon extended to the d-dimensional case [15–23].
Most of these studies, however, focused on the 2-basis and
the (d + 1)-basis cases, and the research on the most general
case is still absent. In this article, we present the study on such
a general (g + 1)-basis QKD protocol.
In principle, the quantum states of a higher dimension can
be encoded in a continuous variable system such as a har-
monic oscillator [24]. It is of fundamental interest, theoret-
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ically, how a (g + 1)-basis QKD protocol is formalized. Our
investigation of the (g + 1)-basis protocol is a natural gener-
alization of the previously studied cases. The results of our
systematic study may help one balance the security gain and
the implementation cost by changing the choice of g.
In this article, our general QKD protocol that uses arbitrary
g+1MUBs is the following. Suppose Alice, the sender, wants
to send Bob, the receiver, a set of classical symbols consisting
of 0, 1, ..., d− 1. To start, Alice encodes every symbol, say i,
into a pure quantum state |i〉 or |˜i(k)〉 of one randomly chosen
MUB out of the g+1 and sends the state to Bob. Upon receipt,
Bob measures the state using again a randomly chosen basis,
which is correct with probability 1/(g + 1). Subsequently,
the choice of bases are publicly announced by Alice, and the
states measured in bases different from they are prepared are
discarded by the two parties. In the absence of any eaves-
dropping and environmental noises, Alice and Bob are then
left with identical strings of symbols while they are left with
partially correlated strings in the presence of Eve, an eaves-
dropper. By checking the agreement of a subset of the symbol
sequence, Alice and Bob can decide whether to continue or
abort the protocol. If the disagreement is below a threshold,
they then perform a direct reconciliation and a privacy amplifi-
cation to obtain a set of shared key. In this article, we consider
that Eve attacks the QKD by intercepting and cloning the state
being sent to Bob. For simplicity, we think of that Eve uses a
fixed and balanced (balanced between different bases) cloning
transformation for each qudit, and that Eve measures her state
before the one-way post-processing between Alice and Bob.
In this article, we investigate Eve’s attack scheme by two
slightly different approaches, both starting from a general
form of cloning transformation proposed in Ref. [25]. One
approach is considering the optimal cloner for Eve where we
maximize the fidelities of the state of Eve. The other is consid-
ering maximizing the information Eve has about Alice’s state,
which, rather than maximizing the fidelities, is defined as the
optimal attack. We do these separately in Sec. II and Sec. IV
and compare the two approaches subsequently. As we shall
2see, they give different results. The second approach is done
in a somewhat restrictive sense, but it is sufficient to prove the
difference between the optimal cloner and the optimal attack.
Sec. III gives some analytical solutions to the optimal cloner
in special cases, including the symmetric cloner correspond-
ing to a general g. In Sec. V, we introduce a side product of
our first approach to the QKD attack, where we present the
link between a QKD cloner and a revised asymmetric form of
the optimal symmetric phase covariant quantum cloning ma-
chine proposed in Ref. [26] and prove the optimality of the
latter. In Sec. VI, we end the article by a brief conclusion.
II. THE OPTIMAL CLONER OF EVE
Now we investigate the optimal cloner that Eve can use.
Before proceeding, let us first introduce some notations. In
dimension d, there are d+1 mutually unbiased bases, namely
{|i〉} and {|˜i(k)〉} (k = 0, 1 , ... , d− 1), which more explic-
itly are
|˜i(k)〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
ωi(d−j)−ksj |j〉, (1)
with sj = j + ... + (d − 1) and ω = ei 2pid [27]. By saying
two bases, say {|˜i(0)〉} and {|˜i(1)〉}, are mutually unbiased,
we mean that |〈˜i(1)|k˜(0)〉| = 1√
d
for any |k˜(0)〉 and |˜i(1)〉 in
the two bases respectively. The generalized Pauli matrices σx
and σz act on the states so that σx|j〉 = |j + 1〉 and σz|j〉 =
ωj |j〉. Throughout the article, we omit the “modulo d,” which
is the case here. We define Umn = σmx σnz so that Umn|j〉 =
ωjn|j+m〉. Finally, the generalized d-dimensional Bell states
read
|Φmn〉 = (I⊗ Um,−n)|Φ00〉, (2)
with m, n = 0, 1, ... , d− 1 and
|Φ00〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|j〉|j〉. (3)
Now, we consider the optimal cloner for Eve. Suppose a
state |ψ〉A is sent by Alice and intercepted by Eve. Then, Eve
prepares a maximally entangled state |Φ00〉E′E and performs
a unitary transformation U of the general form proposed in
Ref. [25]:
U =
d−1∑
m,n=0
amn(Umn ⊗ Um,−n ⊗ I). (4)
Here, amn are the parameters of the unitary transformation,
satisfying
∑
m,n |amn|2 = 1. This transformation yields
U |ψ〉A|Φ00〉E′E
=
∑
m,n
amnUmn|ψ〉B ⊗ |Φ−m,n〉E′E (5a)
=
∑
m,n
bmn|Φ−m,n〉BE′ ⊗ Umn|ψ〉E , (5b)
whereA, B, E andE′ denote Alice, Bob, Eve and her cloning
machine respectively. bmn are the discrete fourier transform
of amn, i.e. bmn = 1d
∑
k,r akrω
kn−rm
. Eqs. (5a) and (5b)
make it convenient to write down the density matrices of Bob
as well as Eve. For |ψ〉A being state |i〉 or |˜i(k)〉 of each MUB,
we have
ρB =
d−1∑
m,n=0
|amn|2|i+m〉〈i+m|, (6a)
ρ˜
(k)
B =
d−1∑
m,n=0
|amn|2(Umn |˜i(k)〉B)(〈˜i(k)|BU †mn), (6b)
ρE =
d−1∑
m,n=0
|bmn|2|i +m〉〈i+m|, (6c)
ρ˜
(k)
E =
d−1∑
m,n=0
|bmn|2(Umn |˜i(k)〉E)(〈˜i(k)|EU †mn) (6d)
(k = 0, 1, ... , g − 1).
Let us consider the fidelities of the states B and E with
respect to all the g + 1 different bases. The fidelity here can
be defined as F ≡ 〈ψ|ρoutred.|ψ〉, the value of which differs for
states of different bases. With the help of the properties of the
Pauli matrices and the Bell states, we figure out the fidelities
of B and E for each mutually unbiased basis:
FB =
∑
n
|a0n|2, (7a)
F˜
(k)
B =
∑
m
|am,km|2, (7b)
FE =
1
d
∑
m
|
∑
n
amn|2, (7c)
F˜
(k)
E =
1
d
∑
n
|
∑
m
am,n+km|2 (7d)
(k = 0, 1, ... , g − 1).
For the QKD using g + 1 MUBs, without loss of general-
ity, we suppose that the bases {|i〉}, {|˜i(0)〉}, ..., {|˜i(g−1)〉}
are chosen by the two legitimate parties. For simplicity, we
assume that Eve’s attack is balanced, i.e. she induces an equal
probability of error for all the g + 1 MUBs. This assumption
follows from the reasoning that Eve can be detected easily by
unbalanced disturbance otherwise, and that, as we find, Eve
cannot maximize all her g + 1 fidelities simultaneously if the
disturbance is unbalanced. Hence, we assume
FB = F˜
(0)
B = ... = F˜
(g−1)
B . (8)
At this point, to obtain an optimal cloner, Eve has to maximize
her fidelities for a given FB , which quantifies the disturbance.
We claim and will show later that Eve can maximize all her
g+1 fidelities simultaneously and that they are equal. We start
3by a “vectorization” of the matrix elements of (amn). Let
~αi = (a1,1i, ..., ad−1,(d−1)i) (i = 0, ... , g − 1), (9)
~A = (A1, ... , Ad−1), (10)
Ai =
d−1∑
j 6=0,i,...,(g−1)i
aij (i = 1, ... , d− 1). (11)
The rest elements are a0j (j = 0, ... , d − 1). Eq. (8) gives
the following restrictions:
d−1∑
j=1
|a0j |2 = FB − |a00|2, (12)
||~αi||2 = FB − |a00|2 (i = 0, ..., g − 1). (13)
One of Eve’s fidelity FE now reads
FE =
1
d
(|
d−1∑
j=0
a0j |2 + ||
g−1∑
i=0
~αi + ~A||2). (14)
Eqs. (12)-(14) tell us how the fidelities of Eve and Bob are
coupled with each other.
Now we show how Eqs. (9)-(14) work by doing the g = 2
version of them. The results for a generic g can be obtained
analogously. For g = 2,
FE =
1
d
(|
d−1∑
j=0
a0j |2 + ||~α0 + ~α1 + ~A||2),
d−1∑
j=1
|a0j |2 = ||~α0||2 = ||~α1||2 = FB − |a00|2.
We tentatively fix the values of |a00| and ~A. By vector ma-
nipulation, it is easy to find that the maximum FE is achieved
when
~α0, ~α1 ∝ ~A,
a01 = ... = a0,d−1 =
√
FB − |a00|2
d− 1 e
iArg(a00).
Unfixing |a00| and ~A, FE becomes a function of them and is
positively correlated to || ~A|| directly. Using the normalization
condition
∑
m,n |amn|2 = 1, we find that || ~A|| is maximal
when ai,2i = ai,3i = ... = ai,(d−1)i (i = 1, ... , d− 1). Now
we visualize the matrix (amn):
(amn) =


v x x x ...
x1 x1 y1 y1 . . .
x2 y2 x2 y2 . . .
x3 y3 y3 x3 . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

 ,
where
x =
√
FB − |v|2
d− 1 e
iArg(v),
xi =
√
FB − |v|2 Ai|| ~A||
, yi =
Ai
d− 2 ,
|| ~A|| =
√
1 + 2|v|2 − 3FB .
Correspondingly, Eve’s fidelity FE becomes
FE =
1
d
[(|v|+
√
(d− 1)(FB − |v|2))2
+ (
√
1 + 2|v|2 − 3FB + 2
√
FB − |v|2)2].
Thus far, we have maximized one of Eve’s fidelities. The other
fidelities can be obtained simply by transposing the roles of
“the horizontal direction,” “the vertical direction,” and “the
diagonal direction” of the matrix (amn) and redefining ~α0,
~α1, and ~A accordingly. Doing so, we find that the condition
for optimization of all Eve’s fidelities, with an overall phase
omitted, is
(amn) =


v x x x . . .
x x y y . . .
x y x y . . .
x y y x . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

 ,
where the elements are all real, and
x =
√
FB − v2
d− 1 , y =
√
1 + 2v2 − 3FB
(d− 1)(d− 2) .
All Eve’s fidelities are found to be equal. They are equal to
FE =
1
d
{[v + (d− 1)x]2 + (d− 1)[2x+ (d− 2)y]2}.
The results for a generic g are analogous to those for g = 2.
The difference is that some “2” are substituted by “g.” We thus
present the following optimization condition and the optimal
Eve’s fidelities:
FE = F˜
(0)
E = ... = F˜
(g−1)
E =
1
d
{[v + (d− 1)x]2 + (d− 1)[gx+ (d− g)y]2}, (15)
amn =


v, m = n = 0,
x, m = 0, n 6= 0 or m 6= 0, n = km,
y, otherwise
(16)
(k = 0, ... , g − 1), for some v,
where
x =
√
FB − v2
d− 1 , y =
√
1 + gv2 − (g + 1)FB
(d− 1)(d− g) . (17)
One notices that there is still an undetermined, independent
variable v. To achieve the maximal FE for a given FB , one
needs to further optimize the value of v. In some cases, this
can be done analytically, but, in the general case, there seems
to be no evident analytical expression. Those analytical re-
sults are presented in Sec. III. We do numerical calculation
for the general case.
To show the performance of the optimal cloner, we choose
d = 5 as an example and plot the optimized FE and v curves
4FIG. 1: (color online). The curves of the fidelity FE (dashed blue
lines) and the parameter v (solid red lines) as functions of FB of
the optimal cloner for d = 5 and g = 1, 2, ..., 5. The g = 1 and
g = 5 lines are derived from Eqs. (19) and (21) respectively. The
curves for general g’s are numerically computed from Eqs. (15)-
(17). The general-g curves in some domains with very small FB
are incomputable by Eqs. (15)-(17), but they can be obtained by
exchanging the roles of E and B.
as functions of FB in FIG. 1. The figure shows that, as FB
increases, FE decreases, i.e. as the disturbance decreases, the
state E resembles the original state less. The figure also shows
reasonable shifts of the curves as g varies. As g increases, i.e.
as more bases are used, the FE curve shifts down, suggest-
ing that FE is lower for a given FB . The difference between
adjacent curves is small for large g’s.
III. ANALYTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE OPTIMAL
CLONER
In this section, we present the analytical expressions of FE
and v for some special cases. The first one is the g = 1 case.
For g = 1, an easier method gives that
v = FB , x =
√
FB(1− FB)
d− 1 , y =
1− FB
d− 1 , (18)
whence
FE =
1
d
[
√
FB +
√
(d− 1)(1− FB)]2. (19)
The second set of analytical results is for g = d. In this case,
there exists no y in the matrix (amn), and v has a fixed value
given below.
v =
√
(d+ 1)FB − 1
d
, x =
√
1− FB
d(d− 1) (20)
whence
FE =
1
d2
[√
(d+ 1)FB − 1 +
√
(d− 1)(1− FB)
]2
+ (1− FB). (21)
Eqs. (19) and (21) recover the previous known results in Ref.
[15]. Here, they are related by parameters v and g within a
unified framework.
The third case in which we have analytical results is that
Eve and Bob have equal fidelities, i.e. FE = FB = F . We
start by observing the following fact: When FB = FE = F ,
Eq. (15) is equivalent to√
(d− g)[1 + gv2 − (g + 1)F ]
= v
√
d− 1− (g + 1)
√
F − v2. (22)
We square this equation and let u =
√
F − v2, and we end up
with an quadratic equation of u and v,
(d+ 1)(g + 1)
d− g u
2 +
2d− g − 1
d− g v
2
− 2(g + 1)
√
d− 1
d− g uv = 1, (23)
which represents an ellipse centering at the origin. The fidelity
F = u2+v2 is the square of the distance from the origin to the
point (u, v) and is thus maximal at one end of the major axis.
It is easy to find that point by diagonalizing the coefficient
matrix. The eigenvalues of that coefficient matrix are found
to be
λ± =
d
2(d− g) [(g + 3)± P (d, g)], (24)
where
P (d, g) =
√
(g + 3)2 − 8(d− g)(g + 1)
d
. (25)
By further calculating the eigenvectors, we figure out the max-
imal fidelity F and the corresponding parameter v. The max-
imal fidelity is
F =
1
λ−
=
2
d
d− g
(g + 3)− P (d, g) .
=
2
d
d− g
(g + 3)−
√
(g + 3)2 − 8 (d−g)(g+1)
d
. (26)
The corresponding v satisfies
u
v
=
(d+ 1)(g + 1)− (d− g)λ+
−(g + 1)√d− 1 (27)
and is thus
v = [
2
d
× (d− 1)(d− g)
(g + 3)− P (d, g)×
1
(d− 1) + [ d2(g+1)P (d, g)− 1− d2 g−1g+1 ]2
]
1
2 . (28)
5We remark that Eqs. (26) and (28) are the results for an op-
timal symmetric cloning machine that clones arbitrary g + 1
MUBs and that has not been studied. We can find that, as g
increase, F increases as it is expected.
IV. THE OPTIMAL ATTACK OF EVE
In our g + 1 basis QKD protocol, we consider that Eve in-
tercepts each state and copies it using a fixed cloning machine
of the form of Eq. (4). We now think of that Eve’s scheme
is to maximizes her information about the state, rather than
the fidelity, for a given, balanced disturbance. We consider
that the post-processing between Alice and Bob is one-way,
consisting of a direct reconciliation and a privacy amplifica-
tion. Therefore, the amount of secret information extractable
by Alice and Bob reads
r = IAB − IAE , (29)
where IAB (or IAE) is the mutual information between the
two classical strings of symbols of Alice and Bob (or of Alice
and Eve). Note that Eve can measure E′ and E jointly, so
IAE represents the mutual information between the classical
random variable A and the random variable pair E′ and E,
which is Eve’s joint-measurement outcome (for convenience,
we denote the associated random variables again by A, B, E′,
and E).
Let us now see what restrictions are imposed on Eve.
We supposed that Eve’s attack is balanced between different
bases, i.e. the fidelities of Bob’s state are same for different
MUBs. Here, for similar reasons, we also suppose that, for
each basis, the probabilities that Bob make different errors
are equal (one can check that this restriction is compatible
with the results in Sec. II). Say the error Bob makes is m
(m = 0, 1, ... , d − 1), i.e. Bob’s symbol is greater than
Alice’s symbol by m. Then, from Eqs. (6a)-(6d), we find the
following explicit expressions for these restrictions:
d−1∑
j=0
|amj |2 =
{
FB , m = 0,
1−FB
d−1 , m 6= 0,
(30)
d−1∑
i=0
|ai,ki−m|2 =
{
FB , m = 0,
1−FB
d−1 , m 6= 0
(31)
(k = 0, 1, ... , g − 1).
Under these restrictions, one can easily find that the mutual
information between Bob and Alice is given by
IAB = log2 d+ FB log2 FB + (1− FB) log2
1− FB
d− 1 . (32)
To find IAE for one basis {|i〉}, we first rewrite Eq. (5a) as
|i〉A →
∑
m,j
(
1√
d
∑
n
amnω
n(i−j)
)
|i+m〉B|j〉E′ |j+m〉E .
(33)
As mentioned above, IAE is between the random variable A
and the random variable pair (E′, E). Suppose (E′, E) takes
the value (e′, e). Eq. (33) tells us that it is equivalent to rep-
resent (e′, e) by (m, e′). Thus, Eve’s information IAE can be
written as
IAE = −
∑
m,e′
p(m, e′) log2 p(m, e
′)
+
∑
a,m,e′
p(a)p(m, e′|a) log2 p(m, e′|a). (34)
a is the value the random variable A takes. We assume that
Alice sends symbols randomly. Thus, in Eq. (34), p(a) =
1
d
. The other terms in Eq. (34) are given below, as they are
derived from Eq. (33).
p(m, e′|a) = 1
d
|
∑
n
amnω
n(a−e′)|2, (35)
p(m, e′) =
1
d
∑
a
p(m, e′|a). (36)
The expressions for IAE of the other bases can be writ-
ten analogously. Most generically, the optimal attack can be
found by maximizing the IAE’s under the restrictions of Eqs.
(30) and (31). This can be done in principle, but it is hard
because of the great number of variables and summations.
Hence, instead, we here maximize Eve’s information condi-
tionally: We suppose that the matrix (amn) takes the form
of Eq. (16) but that v is adjustable to maximize Eve’s infor-
mation (rather than Eve’s fidelities). One can check that Eq.
(16) satisfies Eqs. (30) and (31), and one need only calculate
IAE with respect to one basis because Eq. (16) is balanced be-
tween different bases. We shall compare the results with those
of the optimal cloner approach later. In this more restrictive
case, amn are given partial freedom, but as we shall see, this
is sufficient to prove the deviation of the optimal attack from
the optimal cloner.
We refer to Eq. (16) and find that Eq. (35) now reads
p(m, e′|a) =

[v+(d−1)x]2
d
, m = 0, e′ = a,
(v−x)2
d
, m = 0, e′ 6= a,
[gx+(d−g)y]2
d
, m 6= 0, e′ = a,
(x−y)2
d
| 1−ωmgt1−ωmt |2, m 6= 0, e′ = a− t (t 6= 0).
(37)
Then, numerical calculation can be easily done by adjusting
v to maximize IAE , and both IAB and IAE become functions
of FB . Let us focus on the critical point where the amount
of extractable information is zero, i.e., according to Eq. (29),
IAB = IAE . As usual, we substitute FB with DI , the dis-
turbance, defined as DI = 1 − FB . We compute the DI ’s
associated with zero extractable information for several d’s
and list them in TABLE I. The values of these critical DI ’s
show regular behaviors: As d or g increases, DI increases,
i.e. as more bases are used, higher disturbance is acceptable
for Alice and Bob.
6DI(%)
g
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d
2 14.64 15.64
3 21.13 22.47 22.67
5 27.60 28.91 29.12 29.20 29.23
7 30.90 32.10 32.26 32.32 32.36 32.38 32.39
TABLE I: The disturbance DI associated with zero extractable in-
formation for Alice and Bob. These values are obtained with condi-
tionally maximized IAE , where (amn) is restricted to the form of Eq.
(16). For the d’s and g’s we consider, DI shows regular behaviors:
Both when d increases and when g increases, DI increases. Since
the unconditionally maximized IAE can be slightly higher, the real
critical DI can be slightly lower than the values here.
It is interesting to see whether the maximizing information
approach and the maximizing fidelity approach are equiva-
lent. For definiteness, let us consider whether the optimal
cloner corresponds to the maximal IAE . We substitute the
amn in Eqs. (34)-(36) by the values associated with the opti-
mal cloner. This means that we plug into Eq. (37) the value
of v of the optimal cloner, as is calculated in Sec. II. Then,
we similarly end up with a table (TABLE II) of the distur-
bance associated with zero extractable information. We use a
different notation DF here to indicate that it corresponds to
the maximized FE rather than the maximized IAE . In TA-
DF (%)
g
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
d
2 14.64 15.64
3 21.13 22.99 22.67
5 27.64 29.75 29.83 29.63 29.23
7 31.10 33.24 33.16 33.00 32.83 32.64 32.39
TABLE II: The disturbance DF associated with zero extractable
information, obtained simply by plugging the values of amn of the
optimal cloner into Eqs. (34)-(36). DF has an irregular behavior: As
g increases, DF does not change monotonously. DF deviates above
DI of TABLE I except for g = d, in which case v is fixed, and the
higher the dimension, the larger the deviation. This suggests that the
optimal cloner is not the optimal attack (see the text).
BLE II, DF shows an irregular behavior: As g increases, i.e.
as more bases are used, DF does not always increase. DF is
greater than DI except for g = d, in which case v is fixed, and
the deviation tends to be larger as d increases. As we know,
associated with DI is the IAE that is maximized under the
condition that (amn) is of the form Eq. (16), so the maximal
IAE free of this condition may be slightly larger and thus the
condition-free DI may be lower. Since DF is larger than the
conditional DI , it is larger than the condition-freeDI . There-
fore, maximizing FE is not equivalent to maximizing IAE ,
and the optimal cloner does not correspond to the optimal at-
tack.
V. PHASE COVARIANT QUANTUM CLONING MACHINE
We now introduce a side product of the optimal cloner ap-
proach to our g+1 protocol QKD. As mentioned in Ref. [15],
the optimal cloner for d + 1 MUBs (g = d) is the universal
quantum cloning machine [25, 28]. For d MUBs (g = d− 1),
one may intuitively think of phase-covariant quantum cloning
machine. In this section, we show that the optimal cloner
of d MUBs is equivalent to the optimal asymmetric phase-
covariant quantum cloning machine. More specifically, we
show that it is equivalent to a revised asymmetric form of the
symmetric phase-covariant quantum qudit cloning machine
presented in Ref. [26], and we prove the optimality of that
revised form.
In Ref. [26], the following equatorial states are considered:
|Φ〉(in) = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
eiφj |j〉, (38)
where φj are arbitrary phase parameters. (Thus, the corre-
sponding MUB cloning machine should be the one that clones
the bases {|˜i(0)〉}, ..., and {|˜i(d−1)〉}.) The explicit expression
for the symmetric cloning transformation is given as
|i〉 → α|ii〉12|i〉R + β√
2(d− 1)
∑
j 6=i
(|ij〉+ |ji〉)|j〉, (39)
where 1, 2 represent the two clones while R is the ancillary
state. α and β are real parameters that satisfy α2 + β2 = 1.
The optimal fidelity for the symmetric cloning machine reads
Foptimal =
1
4d
(d+ 2 +
√
d2 + 4d− 4). (40)
One finds that Eq. (40) is consistent with Eq. (26).
Now we claim that the optimal asymmetric phase-covariant
quantum cloning machine is equivalent to the optimal cloner
of the d MUBs and takes the form
|i〉 → α|ii〉|i〉+ β√
d− 1
∑
j 6=i
(cos θ|ij〉+ sin θ|ji〉)|j〉, (41)
where θ is a real parameter. To prove this claim, we first write
down the fidelities associated with this cloning transforma-
tion,
F1 =
1
d
+
2αβ
d
√
d− 1 cos θ + β
2(d− 2)
d
cos2 θ, (42)
F2 =
1
d
+
2αβ
d
√
d− 1 sin θ + β
2(d− 2)
d
sin2 θ, (43)
where the constraint α2 + β2 = 1 still holds. We per-
form a numerical calculation that manipulates α, β, as well
as θ to maximize one fidelity given the other. The results
show that the optimized fidelities for this asymmetric phase-
covariant cloning quantum machine are equal to the fidelities
of the optimal d-MUB cloner, as are computed in Sec. II.
Since cloning equatorial states has a higher requirement than
cloning d MUBs, the optimality of a d-MUB cloner infers the
optimality of an asymmetric phase-covariant quantum cloning
machine with the same achieved fidelities, and their equiva-
lency. This proves our claim.
7VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we study the general, d-dimensional QKD
that uses arbitrary g+1 MUBs, focusing on the individual at-
tack by Eve and the one-way post-processing (a direct recon-
ciliation plus a privacy amplification) by Alice and Bob. This
investigation of the general g+1 MUB QKD protocol is a nat-
ural generalization of the QKD in higher dimension and may
help one balance the gain and the cost of the implementation.
In this article, we investigate Eve’s attack by two different ap-
proaches. One is maximizing FE , the fidelity of Eve’s state
E, while the other is maximizing IAE , the information Eve
has about Alice classical symbol. In the first approach (Sec.
II), we derive the fidelities and the parameter of the optimal
cloner and demonstrate their behaviors, which are reasonable.
It turns out that in some special cases, the most significant
of which is the symmetric cloning, the optimal cloner can by
solved analytically (Sec. III). In the second approach (Sec.
IV), we give the equations for the most generic calculation
for IAE maximization, but, considering its complexity, we do
instead a more restrictive version. Though restricted, the cal-
culation still shows interesting results. In particular, it proves
(except for g = d) the deviation of the optimal cloner from
the optimal attack. Sec. V is dedicated to a side product of
our optimal cloner approach. We show that the optimal asym-
metric phase covariant quantum cloning machine is equivalent
to the optimal cloner of d MUBs (g = d − 1). We also show
that this optimal asymmetric phase covariant quantum cloning
machine can be formulated as a revised version of the optimal
symmetric cloning transformation presented in Ref. [26]. As
the bottom line, we here remark that there still exist several
possible extensions, which may be of future interests, for our
general, (g + 1)-basis, qudit-based QKD protocol: extension
to two-way post-processing, to prime-power dimensional sys-
tems, and to the coherent attack.
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